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CRIMINAL LAW—FOURTH AMENDMENT—ROADBLOCKS
ESTABLISHED FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF DRUG INTERDICTION ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES—
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000).
In August 1998, the Indianapolis Police Department (IPD)
began to utilize vehicle checkpoints as a method to curb narcotics
trafficking. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2000). The
checkpoint locations were typically selected on the basis of high
traffic volume and proximity to high-crime areas. Id. at 451.
Members of the IPD who conducted the stops did not stop vehicles
based on any discernable characteristics. Id. at 450-51. Instead, a
predetermined number of vehicles were detained at a given
checkpoint. Most vehicles were stopped during daylight hours and
detained for less than five minutes. Id. at 451. While stopped,
officers required motorists to produce their driver licenses and
automobile registrations, observed drivers for sign of intoxication,
and walked a drug-sniffing dog around the outside of the vehicles.
Id. at 450-51.
Between August and November of 1998, the IPD conducted six
checkpoints and stopped a total of 1,161 vehicles. Id. at 450. One
hundred and four motorists were arrested as a result, representing
nine percent of the total. Although fifty-five individuals were
charged with drug related crimes, forty-nine individuals were
arrested on non-drug related charges.
Late in September 1998, James Edmond and Joell Palmer were
stopped individually at one of the IPD’s checkpoints. Id. at 451. The
two initiated a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and the class of
motorists who were stopped or who were subject to being detained
at roadblocks.
The lawsuit alleged that the IPD’s narcotics
checkpoints violated their Fourth Amendment rights and their
rights under the Indiana Constitution.
Edmond and Palmer
requested damages and attorney’s fees for themselves; they sought
declaratory relief and moved for a preliminary injunction on behalf
of themselves and the class.
Although the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana agreed to certify the class, it refused to grant the
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preliminary injunction, holding that the IPD’s narcotics roadblocks
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. In a split decision, the
United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the narcotics
checkpoints were violative of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Id.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the IPD’s program violated rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment. Id. In affirming the Court of Appeals, the
Court held that a checkpoint program violates the Fourth
Amendment when its primary purpose is a “general interest in
crime control.” Id. at 451, 457.
Justice O’Connor, writing for the six person majority, began the
Court’s analysis by explaining that a search or seizure requires an
element of individualized suspicion to be considered reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 451. The Court emphasized
that only in limited circumstances does the rule of individualized
suspicion not apply. Id. The Court then cited four examples of
instances when individualized suspicion is not required to conduct
a search or seizure. Id. at 451-53.
First, the Court referred to the “special needs” exception, which
includes random drug testing of student athletes, customs
employees, and railroad employees involved in accidents. Id. at 451
(citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)).
Second, the Court explained that generalized searches for
limited administrative purposes, such as government inspections of
certain businesses, inspections to determine the cause of a fire, and
housing compliance inspections, were permissible. Id. at 452 (citing
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)).
Third, the Court discussed why roadblocks conducted by the
United States Border Patrol are considered to be constitutionally
permissible. Id. Referring to United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 551-54 (1976), the Court described the “particular context”
surrounding the issue of border checkpoints. Id. The Court recalled
its application of a balancing test in Martinez-Fuerte that weighed the
Government’s interest in curbing the flow of illegal aliens across the
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Nation’s borders with an individual’s interest against unreasonable
searches.
Id.
(citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561-64).
Recognizing the difficulties faced by the Government in halting
illegal border traffic, the daunting prospect of discerning whether
particular cars are carrying illegal aliens, and the “relatively modest
degree of intrusion entailed by the stops,” the Court held that the
balance weighed in the Government’s favor. Id. (citing MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-64).
Finally, the Court justified Michigan Department of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), a decision holding that sobriety checkpoints
were constitutional. Id. The Court reasoned that stops to detect
intoxicated motorists were permissible because the checkpoints
were intended to reduce the danger of drunk drivers on roadways
and because an obvious connection existed between the need for
highway safety and the use of suspicionless searches at roadblocks.
Id. at 453. The Court also noted that although random suspicionless
stops of motorists to check licenses and motor vehicle registration
are unconstitutional, the “questioning of all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type stops” is constitutionally permissible. Id. (citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). The Court specifically
designated these stops as valid because they further highway safety,
and are not simply the means to advance a general interest in crime
control. Id.
Before delving into its analysis of the IPD’s narcotics
checkpoint program, the Court clarified that highway checkpoints
constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 454.
However, the majority also declared that the IPD’s use of a drugsniffing dog to investigate the exterior of automobiles does not
cause checkpoints to become a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 453. Instead, looking to the primary
purpose of the IPD’s checkpoints, the Court distinguished the
Indianapolis
program
from
those
checkpoints
deemed
constitutional. Id.
Justice O’Connor continued the majority opinion, emphasizing
that the Court was “particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to
the general rule of individualized suspicion where governmental
authorities primarily pursue their general crime control ends.” Id. at
455. Furthermore, the Court differentiated the IPD’s narcotics
roadblocks from the sobriety checkpoints at issue in Sitz. Id.
Though the Court conceded that drug interdiction checkpoints
would further community interests by removing drugs from the
street, unlike the sobriety checkpoints in Sitz the IPD’s roadblocks
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did not serve to eradicate any immediate threat to highway safety.
Id.
Moreover, the Court refused to recognize the IPD’s argument
that the narcotics roadblocks were analogous to the Border Patrol
checkpoints in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. The Court admitted that the
roadblocks in Martinez-Fuerte were designed to promote the
Government’s interest in controlling the flow of illegal aliens across
the United States’ borders, but held that governmental interest alone
often cannot justify “a regime of suspicionless searches or seizures.”
Id. Instead, the Court concluded, the nature of such a program must
be carefully examined to determine the program’s principle
purpose. Id.
Next, the Court dismissed the IPD’s reliance upon Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) to justify suspicionless stops. Id. at
456. Justice O’Connor clarified the Court’s holding in Whren, stating
that although the actual, subjective motivations of officers are not
pertinent to determining the constitutionality of traffic stops, Whren
does not apply to “cases dealing with intrusions that occur pursuant
to a general scheme absent individualized suspicion.” Id. In these
cases, the Court held that an inquiry into the program’s purpose is
appropriate. Id.
Finally, the Court disagreed with the IPD’s argument that the
stops were justifiable because the checkpoints served the secondary
purposes of removing intoxicated motorists from the highway and
verifying drivers’ licenses and automobile registrations. Id. at 457.
The Court rejected the IPD’s position, holding that if this logic were
applied, “law enforcement authorities would be able to establish
checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included
a license or sobriety check.” Id. To prevent such ad hoc justification,
the Court declared that the primary purpose of the checkpoint
program must be discerned. Id.
The Court emphasized that, in constitutional situations such as
these, the reasoning of Whren should apply, and an inquiry into the
subjective motivations of officers should not be conducted. Id. The
Court also noted that in emergency situations, such as preventing
the threat of a terrorist attack or catching a dangerous fugitive, law
enforcement agencies could establish checkpoints related to a
general interest in crime control. Id. In the instant case, however,
the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals holding that because the
primary purpose of the IPD’s narcotics checkpoints was to promote
a general interest in crime control, the program violated the Fourth
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Amendment. Id. at 458.
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas,
and joined by Justice Scalia as to Part I, attacked the majority
opinion, and characterized the IPD’s checkpoints as “legitimate
seizures.” Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In Part I of his dissenting
opinion, the Chief Justice cited Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1976),
which held that roadblocks are constitutional if they are “carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers.” Id. The Chief Justice then applied
the Court’s reasoning in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz to the case at bar.
Id. Stating that “this case follows naturally from Martinez-Fuerte and
Sitz,” Chief Justice Rehnquist defended the constitutionality of the
IPD’s checkpoints, asserting that

although the primary purpose of the IPD’s roadblocks was to curb
illegal narcotics trafficking, that fact should not determine the
program’s constitutionality. Id. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Turning to the Court’s holdings in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and
Prouse, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the IPD’s narcotics
checkpoints to be constitutional because officers were instructed to
“look for signs of impairment” and to check the validity of driver’s
licenses and automobile registrations. Id. As the IPD’s roadblocks
served these legitimate state interests, the Chief Justice asserted that
it was “constitutionally irrelevant” that the IPD also intended to
curb drug trafficking. Id.
Next, Chief Justice Rehnquist applied Whren to the present case.
Id. The Chief Justice noted that an inquiry into the subjective intent
of the IPD or city council was improper because the roadblocks
served legitimate state interests with minimal intrusion, and were
thus objectively reasonable.
Id. at 459-60 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Concluding Part I, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
the IPD’s narcotics checkpoint program was constitutional under
the Brown standard because it served two important state interests,
and because the stops were conducted in an objectively reasonable
amount of time, in a neutral manner, and with a subjectively
reasonable level of intrusion. Id. at 460. The Chief Justice noted that
the use of a drug-sniffing dog marked the one difference between
prior Supreme Court precedents and the instant case, and
maintained that the use of trained narcotics dogs should not
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invalidate the constitutionality of the IPD’s checkpoints, as the
Court had previously declared dog-sniff inspections constitutional.
Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
The Chief Justice introduced Part II of the dissent by criticizing
the majority’s decision to add “a new non-law-enforcement primary
purpose test” to roadblock seizures. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
opposed applying a “special needs” test to roadblock seizures,
because automobiles are traditionally afforded less privacy than
private dwellings. Id. at 461 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice again concluded that the Brown balancing test formed the
appropriate inquiry, because individuals detained at roadblocks had
a lower expectation of privacy and because the stops were brief and
nonintrusive. Id. Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that
the purpose of highway checkpoints is determinative of their
constitutionality, roadblocks identical to those approved in Sitz and
Martinez-Fuerte run the risk of being invalidated by juries who
determine that a “forbidden purpose” was present. Id. at 461-62
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
In closing, the Chief Justice emphasized the need for the Court
to adhere to the notion of stare decisis, and underscored the
important public safety benefits that narcotics checkpoints similar to
the IPD’s encouraged. Id. at 462 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist concluded the dissent by declaring that the IPD’s
roadblocks, together with the dog sniffs, were consistent with the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion, criticizing
the Court’s decisions in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The Justice explained that a system of suspicionless
stops at highway checkpoints ran afoul of the Framers
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Although Justice
Thomas doubted that the checkpoints in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte
comported with the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”
requirement, the Justice was disinclined to deem them
unconstitutional “without the benefit of briefing and argument.” Id.
Despite reservations regarding the validity of the Court’s previous
decisions, Justice Thomas joined the Chief Justice’s opinion that
established case law obligated the Court to uphold the IPD’s
program. Id.
Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a highly charged issue. In this well-intentioned opinion,
the Court attempted to fairly balance a city’s crime prevention goals
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with the fundamental rights of that city’s citizens and persons
passing through its jurisdiction. Although the majority’s ultimate
resolution of this dilemma affirmed the Court’s desire to protect
individual liberties, one link in its chain of reasoning is flawed: the
Court failed to effectively illustrate why the precedent established
by Martinez-Fuerte did not apply to this matter. Like the Border
Patrol in Martinez-Fuerte, which wanted to control the flow of illegal
immigrants across United States borders, the IPD in this case hoped
to control the flow of illegal narcotics through Indianapolis. The
Court approved the Border Patrol’s scheme in Martinez-Fuerte,
reasoning that the Government experienced great difficulties in
determining which cars carried illegal aliens. Here, the IPD, like
other police departments across the United States, found it difficult
to determine which cars carried illegal narcotics. In both situations,
the degree of intrusion caused by the stops was relatively modest.
The Court’s decision to prohibit narcotics checkpoints runs
afoul of the analogous constitutional precedent set forth in MartinezFuerte. Interpreting the Fourth Amendment to forbid a “general
interest in crime control” appears to be inconsistent with the Court’s
earlier decision to reduce Fourth Amendment protection as a
method to promote a general interest in controlling illegal border
crossings. Despite the positive impact this case will have on
individual liberties, its beneficial aspects may be overshadowed by
the inconsistent application of Supreme Court precedent.
Furthermore, because of its incongruous application of prior law,
this case is likely to confuse other Fourth Amendment matters that
may arise in the future.
Meredith Boylan

